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SURVEILLANCE AND THE SELF: PRIVACY,
IDENTITY, AND TECHNOLOGY
Richard Warner*
INTRODUCTION
Advances in surveillance techniques have greatly increased the
power of others to eavesdrop on our lives. Both government and pri-
vate business have eagerly availed themselves of these advances; so
have terrorists, organized crime, and other wrongdoers. New technol-
ogies help them conceal their activities as well as increase their scope
and effectiveness.' Governments and private businesses have re-
sponded with sophisticated surveillance technologies. In the latter
case, new data collection and analysis techniques not only protect
against wrongdoers, but they also greatly increase efficiency. The
price is a significant loss of privacy. Is the price too high? To what
extent-if any-should we trade privacy for protection and efficiency?
Finding an acceptable tradeoff requires a proper appreciation of the
value of privacy, an appreciation we currently lack. Yet, this may
seem obviously wrong. After all, political philosophy, for the last
three hundred years, has emphasized the critical role of privacy in lim-
iting the power of the state, and, although we may disagree about how
to protect privacy, by now we surely all agree that allowing the state to
reach too deeply into its citizens' lives puts freedom at risk. However,
serving as a shield against an overintrusive state is not the only reason
privacy matters. It also matters to the self; sufficient control over
what others know about us is essential to realizing our identities as
persons. This aspect of privacy has received insufficient attention.2
* Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Professor, Chair of American and Comparative
Law, Catholic University of Lublin, Poland. This Article is based upon a presentation given at
the DePaul University College of Law Symposium: Privacy and Identity: Constructing, Maintain-
ing, and Protecting Personhood held on Saturday, March 13, 2004.
1. See generally Louise I. Shelley, Organized Crime, Terrorism and Cybercrime, in SECURITY
SECTOR REFORM: INSTITUTIONS, SOCIETY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 303-12 (Nomos ed., 2003).
2. The link between privacy and self has been much discussed. See generally Stanely I. Benn,
Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in NoMos XIII: PRIVACY (J. Ronald Pennock & J.W.
Chapman eds., 1971); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Jeffrey H. Rieman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, in
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 300 (Ferdinand David Schoman ed.,
1984); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999).
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I focus exclusively on the relation between privacy and the self, and
I also narrow my focus in two other ways. First, I confine this Article
primarily to privacy threats created by the Internet. The Internet is
the nerve center of the technological innovations that create privacy
concerns. Much of what this Article argues, however, will generalize
to non-Internet contexts. Second, I consider only non-governmental
threats to privacy. The governmental threat is increasingly worrisome.
However, the chorus of concern in that case is already large and
strong, and the threat from private business merits consideration on
its own. In analyzing the business threat, I concentrate on the gain in
efficiency from surveillance technology, not its use to prevent
wrongdoing.
The aspect of privacy with which I am concerned is what Jerry Kang
labels "informational privacy."' 3 Professor Kang distinguishes three
types of privacy rights: spatial, decisional, and informational. 4 Spatial
rights define a physical zone of control over intrusions by others; deci-
sional rights protect an individual's freedom of choice; informational
rights demarcate an ability to determine what others know about us
and what they do with that knowledge. I focus on informational
rights, and when I refer to "privacy" I mean primarily the power to
control what others can learn about us and what they can do with
what they learn. To ensure sufficient power in this regard, businesses
should be required to obtain our consent before they collect certain
types of information about us. Current privacy law does not impose
such a requirement. 5 I also argue that the "consent requirement" is
insufficient on its own to protect privacy adequately.
Part II reviews the important link between advertising and market
efficiency, a link often overlooked in discussions of privacy. Part III
explains the role of privacy in the construction of our identities. Part
IV introduces the "consent requirement," the requirement that busi-
nesses obtain consent before collecting certain types of information;
this Part also considers and answers objections based on the claim that
the requirement treats privacy as if it were property. Part IV con-
cludes by contending that the major issue in regard to the consent
requirement is whether it really succeeds in protecting privacy against
technological threats. Part V identifies the threats. Part VI contends
My view is that these discussions overlook the critical place of "social roles" in development of
the self and the relation between the self and privacy. See infra Part III.C.
3. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193,
1205-12 (1998).
4. Id. at 1202-05.
5. Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877 (2003)
(analyzing and criticizing the current state of privacy law).
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that the consent requirement provides important protection but is not
a complete solution, and calls for additional statutory protection.
II. EFFICIENCY, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY
When considering business threats to privacy, it is easy, in the ea-
gerness to protect privacy, to overlook the critical role that informa-
tion plays in enabling the market exchanges that provide us with
goods and services.6 Consequently, I begin with a reminder of the
remarkable cooperation that the market makes possible.
A. Information and Market Efficiency
Charles Lindblom's engaging example illustrates the coordination
involved in a typical sequence of market exchanges:
During the course of a morning, a number of people step into a
Milan caf6 for an espresso. They do not doubt that it will be availa-
ble. What justifies their confidence? Making the coffee available
rests on a great deal of cooperation, specifically, the assignment to
many people of performances that together accomplish a feat far
beyond the capacity of any one person alone. It is accomplished by
market transactions that assign and link both multiple performances
and multiple chains of them. Farmers cooperate in growing and
harvesting the coffee beans. Truck drivers or locomotive engineers
transport the beans to a seaport on highways or railroads that have
been constructed by many kinds of cooperating laborers. At the
seaport, longshoremen and ships' crews join the chain. At a dock in
Genoa, shipping the beans on to Milan calls again on performances
from longshoremen, warehousers, and truckers. Somewhere along
the chain, some people roast the beans, and others fabricate bags
for carrying them. Think of other participating cooperators: insur-
ers and inspectors, wholesalers and retailers. . . .However great
their distance from Milan, innumerable people play their roles in
cooperation, and no less so than the surly or obliging waiter in the
caf6. 7
Information, not centralized planning, is the thread that ties the indi-
vidual efforts together. The farmers growing coffee beans estimate
the volume buyers will want to purchase. Coffee manufacturers and
6. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Our Data, Ourselves: Privacy, Propertization, and Gender, 34 U.S.F.
L. REV. 633 (2000). In her interesting essay, Bartow complains that "[d]ocilely, we allow corpo-
rate entities to monitor our online efforts to educate and inform ourselves, support each other,
and purchase goods and services for our families and ourselves. This data is then used to more
efficiently separate us from our money." Id. at 636. Bartow's exclusive focus on the negative
aspects of business data overlooks the fact that more efficient provision of goods and services
lowers costs.
7. CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE MARKET SYSTEM: WHAT IT Is, How IT WORKS, AND WHAT
TO MAKE OF IT 36-37 (2001).
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wholesalers coordinate their efforts through communication with each
other and with those who transport the beans from the fields. Whole-
salers estimate the demand from retailers, who in turn estimate the
demand of consumers, like the cafd in Milan, which estimates the de-
mand from its customers. In general, market economies depend on a
flow of information. The more accurate and less costly the informa-
tion, the more efficient the economy. It is more efficient in the sense
that we spend less time and effort to achieve the same results; the
savings can be used for other purposes-education, relief of poverty,
improved health insurance, and so on.
I focus on the flow of information from individual consumers to
businesses. This is an area in which technology has greatly reduced
privacy; the immediate point, however, is not the privacy loss, but the
efficiency gain. Technology has improved efficiency by making it cost-
effective to collect, analyze, and use vast amounts of data about con-
sumers' preferences. The increase in efficiency comes from the in-
creased ability to determine what products and services consumers
want, and from the increased ability to target advertising.8 Targeted
advertising is the process of matching advertising to recipients in ways
that maximize the likelihood that recipients will purchase in re-
sponse.9 When "two marketers are competing for the same cus-
tomer's business, all other things being equal, the marketer with the
greatest scope of information about that particular customer [and
hence the more targeted advertising] ...will be the more efficient
competitor."10 Targeting does not merely benefit businesses; it also
benefits consumers by reducing the amount of irrelevant information
that bombards them.
One way in which technology has greatly increased the ability of
businesses to target advertising is by increasing the ability to aggre-
gate information. Aggregation is perhaps the most serious technol-
8. These observations about advertising and efficiency assume that advertising conveys infor-
mation. Some may rightly object that advertising is often highly manipulative because it is de-
signed to create perceived needs for products and services of doubtful value. See HERBERT
MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN THE IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETIES 5 (1968) (emphasizing that advertising manipulates consumers by creating needs).
See also LINDBLOM, supra note 7, at 188-89 (emphasizing the same point). It is nonetheless true
that advertising informs consumers that certain products are available from particular sources.
9. See http://dbay.ndsu.edu/-dollarbay/howtoplay/howto.definitions.php.
10. DON PEPPERS & MARTHA ROGERS, THE ONE TO ONE FUTURE: BUILDING RELATION-
SHIPS ONE CUSTOMER AT A TIME 138 (1st Currency paperback ed. 1996). Originally published
in 1993, The One to One Future is one of the classics of direct marketing literature. Published
before the explosion of e-commerce on the Internet, its focus on fax machines and computerized
databases make it a fascinating read. Substitute "Internet" for "fax machine" and one would
think one was reading a contemporary commentary on the Internet.
[Vol. 54:847
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ogy-created threat to privacy. Information is aggregated from two
sources-private and public. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litiga-
tion1' illustrates the former. The court noted that DoubleClick "com-
piles user profiles . . . from over 11,000 web sites for which and on
which it provides targeted banner advertising."'1 2 DoubleClick used
cookies to collect "e-mail addresses, home and businesses addresses,
telephone numbers, searches performed on the Internet, Web pages
or sites visited on the Internet and other communications and infor-
mation that users would not ordinarily expect advertisers to be able to
collect."' 13 The court observed that "[o]nce DoubleClick collects in-
formation from the cookies on users' hard drives, it aggregates and
compiles the information to build demographic profiles of users.
Plaintiffs allege that DoubleClick has more than 100 million user
profiles in its database.'
' 4
Public records are also a rich source for constructing profiles. They
"contain a great deal of information about individuals, often very sen-
sitive information."' 5 The information includes the following: Social
security numbers; financial account numbers; family law files may con-
tain information about children as well as allegations of wrongdoing;
insurance litigation files may contain details of medical conditions and
other highly personal information (about the effect of the condition,
preexisting conditions, or information relevant to supporting an alle-
gation that the claims are exaggerated); sexual harassment files may
contain allegations about lifestyle and sexual history; and criminal
files may contain very sensitive personal information. 16 Businesses
like Classified'.com 17 and Accurint 18 aggregate such information to
produce remarkably detailed descriptions of people's lives. Classi-
fied 3.com claims it
has the capabilities to search, gather and report detailed intelligence
on almost anyone or anything on the planet. With access to more
than 425 billion records in 100+ countries, cutting edge access to
11. 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
12. Id. at 502.
13. Id. at 503.
14. Id. at 505.
15. Beth Givens, Public Records on the Internet.- The Privacy Dilemma (Apr. 19, 2002), http://
www.privacyrights.orglar/onlinepubrecs.htm.
16. Id.
17. See Classified3 .com: Global Intelligence Agency, Home Page, at http://www.classified3.
corn (last visited Mar. 28, 2005).
18. Accurint's sales pitch states: "Use the world's most comprehensive and accurate locate
and research tool to achieve better results at a lower cost. Find people, businesses and their
assets. Obtain deep background information. Uncover bankruptcies and criminal histories. Ac-
curint makes your search easy by providing instant access to billions of linked records." See
Accurint Home Page, at http://www.accurint.com (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
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updated databases, and the advantage of having trained experts per-
forming your research, Classified3 .com has the tools and expertise
to make intelligence gathering easier than ever before. 19
B. Two Regulatory Approaches
Protecting privacy means constricting the flow of information that is
the lifeblood of market efficiency.20 There are two regulatory ap-
proaches to finding the appropriate tradeoff between privacy and effi-
ciency: Top-down and bottom-up regulation. "Top-down" regulation
imposes central planning through legislation and court decisions. It
regulates commerce directly by defining what, when, how, and/or with
whom market participants may buy and sell. "Bottom-up" ordering
occurs via property rights and non-legal norms, which define a general
framework within which market participants-not central planners-
decide what, when, how, and with whom they buy and sell.21 The dif-
ference between the two approaches is a matter of degree. The more
an ordering leaves decisions in the hands of market participants, the
more bottom-up it is; the more it takes decisions out of market hands,
the more top-down.
C. Bottom-Up Planning Is More Efficient,
Other Things Being Equal
Other things being equal, letting market participants decide what,
when, and with whom they buy and sell is more efficient than taking
19. See Classified 3.com, supra note 17.
20. It is clear that restricting the flow of data tends to reduce efficiency. See Michael A.
Turner, The Impact of Data Restrictions on Consumer Distance Shopping, http://www.privacy
alliance.org/resources/turner.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
21. Professors Margaret Jane Radin and R. Polk Wagner have a narrower conception of bot-
tom-up regulation. They explain that the terms "top-down" and "bottom-up" refer to "Hayek's
stylized distinction between bottom-up and top-down ordering .... Cyberlibertarians identify
Hayek's top-down central planning with state-backed law and his bottom-up private ordering
with regimes of non-legal customary norms." Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth
of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CH.-KENT L. REV. 1295,
1297 (1998). Cyberlibertarians certainly did use "bottom-up" in this fashion. This conception of
bottom-up ordering is not particularly useful. The reason is that, as Julie Cohen emphasizes,
"[miarket ordering and government oversight are complementary, not mutually exclusive
choices. Market ordering presupposes some ex ante distribution of entitlements." Julie E. Co-
hen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Orthodoxy of "Rights Management", 97 MICH. L. REV.
462, 492 (1998). See also Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1257, 1259 (1998) (noting the need for an initial distribution of entitlements). In
general, property rights play an essential role in placing market decisions in the hands of market
participants. Not only do they define who is entitled to exchange what, but also enable sellers to
control with whom they share business resources and to whom they will sell, as well as where,
when, and how they do so. The distinction between bottom-up and top-down ordering is a ques-
tion of the degree of government control.
[Vol. 54:847
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these decisions out of their hands.2 2 There are two ways in which
"other things" may not be "equal." First, leaving decisions in the
hands of market participants sometimes leads to inefficiency. 23 Leav-
ing decisions about the extent of automobile generated air pollution in
the hands of automobile manufacturers, for example, leads to the deg-
radation of the environment, health problems, and other negative con-
sequences that impose costs far exceeding what the manufacturers
save by not investing in pollution control systems.24 Privacy may in-
volve similar inefficiencies. Consider, for example, the damage
caused by the errors that inevitably occur as information is entered
into databases and as it is used and analyzed. Errors can lead to seri-
ous consequences such as the denial of employment. 25 It may well be
that businesses inefficiently underinvest in error prevention and de-
tection; it is possible that an increased investment would reduce the
damage by far more than the amount of the investment. The possible
inefficiencies in ways businesses deal with personal data merit close
attention.
My focus here, however, will be on the second reason for top-down
regulation: Namely, that leaving decisions in the hands of market par-
ticipants may fail to realize values that we, as a society, want realized.
Laws prohibiting the exploitation of child labor are one example.
26
Even if they reduce efficiency, we would impose them nonetheless in
order to protect children. Similarly, even at the expense of efficiency,
22. Arthur Okun summaries the efficiency claim:
The case for efficiency of capitalism rests on the theory of the "invisible hand," which
Adam Smith first set forth two centuries ago. Through the market, greed is harnessed
to serve social purposes in an impersonal and seemingly automatic way. A competitive
market transmits signals to producers that reflect the values of consumers. If the manu-
facture and distribution of a new product is profitable, the benefits it provides to buyers
necessarily exceed the costs of production. And these costs in turn measure the value
of the other outputs that are sacrificed by using labor and capital to make the new
product. Thus, profitability channels resources into more productive uses and pulls
them away from less productive ones. The producer has the incentive to make what
consumers want and to make it in the least costly way. Nobody is asked to evaluate
what is good for the system or for the society; if he merely pursues his own economic
self-interest, he will automatically serve the social welfare.
ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 50 (1975).
23. See, e.g., LINDBLOM, supra note 7, at 147-48.
24. See generally RICHARD C. PORTER, ECONOMICS AT THE WHEEL: THE COSTS OF CARS AND
DRIVERS (1999).
25. See Givens, supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the adverse effects of nega-
tive information in public records).
26. Child Labor is regulated under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (2000). See U.S. Department of Labor, Youth and Labor, at http://www.dol.gov/dol/
topic/youthlabor/index.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2005). The Department of Labor emphasizes
that the purpose of regulating child labor is to protect the health and safety of children and to
ensure that they have sufficient educational opportunities. Economic efficiency is not the point.
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top-down regulation is desirable to ensure that society provides the
degree of privacy necessary to allow individuals to enjoy sufficient
freedom for adequate self-realization. We should, however, deploy
top-down regulation only where it is really required; otherwise we un-
necessarily sacrifice the efficiency that bottom-up regulation pro-
motes. To see what type of regulation is needed where, we need to
understand the threats technology creates, and to understand the
threats, we need to understand the relation between privacy, freedom,
and the self.
I am not claiming that these relations are the only reason (apart
from restraining government) to protect privacy. It may well be, for
example, that some control over what others know about us is essen-
tial to our psychological well-being in ways that are independent from
the considerations that follow about freedom and the self. These con-
siderations are just one central and important reason to protect
privacy.
III. PRIVACY, FREEDOM, AND THE SELF
William James captures the relevant concept of the self. "I am,"
James writes,
often confronted by the necessity of standing by one of my empiri-
cal selves and relinquishing the rest. Not that I would not, if I could,
be both handsome and fat and well dressed, and a great athlete, and
make a million a year, be a wit, a bon vivant, and a lady killer, as
well as a philosopher, and a philanthropist, statesman, warrior, and
African explorer, as well as a 'tone poet' and saint. But the thing is
simply impossible. The millionaire's work would run counter to the
saint's; the bon vivant and the philanthropist would trip each other;
the philosopher and the lady killer could not well keep house in the
same tenement of clay. Such characters may at the outset of life be
alike possible to a man. But to make anyone of them actual, the
rest must be more or less suppressed. So the seeker of his truest,
strongest, deepest self must review the list carefully, and pick out
the one on which to stake his salvation. All other selves thereupon
become unreal, but the fortunes of this self are real, its failures are
real failures, its triumphs real triumphs, carrying shame and glad-
ness with them.27
You make yourself the person you are by what you "stand by," by the
commitments you strive to realize. This conception of personhood
underlies political philosophy from John Stuart Mill 28 to John Rawls29
27. WILLIAM JAMES, 1 THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 309-10 (1980).
28. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds.,
Yale University Press 2003) (1859).
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and Joseph Raz, 30 and I assume that it is uncontroversial that we are
typically as James describes.
31
A. Complexity and Contradiction
The Jamesian conception requires one emendation. James exagger-
ates when he suggests that "the seeker of his truest, strongest, deepest
self must review the list carefully, and pick out the one on which to
stake his salvation."'32 Our identities are composed of multiple roles:
spouse, parent, professor, friend, applicant for insurance, heir to this
or that religious tradition, product of southern Californian culture,
and so on. In general,
[w]e are none of us defined by membership in a single community
or form of moral life. We are ... heirs of many distinct, sometimes
conflicting, intellectual and moral traditions.... The complexity and
contradictions of our cultural inheritance give to our identities an
aspect of complexity and even of plurality which is not accidental,
but (if we may use such a term) essential to them. For us ... the
power to conceive of ourselves in different ways, to harbour disso-
nant projects and perspectives, to inform our thoughts and lives
with divergent categories and concepts, is integral to our identity as
reflective beings.33
In general, we spread out along a continuum: Harmonious selves with
little conflict occupy one extreme; tortured, conflict-ridden selves, the
other. Most of us most likely occupy a position somewhere in the
middle.
B. Social Roles
An essential step in understanding the link between privacy and the
self is appreciating the function in the development of the self of what
I will call "social roles."' 34 The basic point: We adopt the plans and
projects we "stand by" from roles recognized and understood by the
society in which we live. We do not, as a rule at least, invent a role or
type of activity that society has not already recognized in some form
29. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971).
30. See generally JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
31. One important philosophical task is showing that what is typically true is also necessarily
true, that our Jamesian nature is inescapable. On the issue of necessary truth, see RICHARD
WARNER, FREEDOM, ENJOYMENT, AND HAPPINESS (1987).
32. JAMES, supra note 27, at 310.
33. John Gray, The Politics of Cultural Diversity, in POST-LIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 253, 262-63 (1993).
34. RAZ, supra note 30, at 311 (emphasizing the importance of social roles-what he calls
"social forms"-to the development of the self).
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or other. We choose our roles from those already recognized and un-
derstood by the society in which we live. These are the roles I label
"social roles." Being a bird watcher is an example. You could not be
a bird watcher in a society that does not recognize that role. Trying to
imagine the opposite shows why-and in what sense-the claim is
true.
Imagine a primitive tribe whose sole use for animals is to hunt and
eat them; you are the lone anomaly who spends hours tracking down
birds merely to look at them.35 Although you watch birds, you are not
a bird watcher in the sense that a member of the Audubon Society is.
The Audubon member's bird-watching behavior fits a recognized so-
cial pattern. Our society recognizes that people enjoy bird-watching,
and the bird watcher understands himself or herself, and is understood
by others, as someone who enjoys watching birds. To call yourself a
bird-watcher is not just to say you watch birds; it is also to ascribe to
yourself a recognized role. In the primitive tribe, your anomalous bird
gazing does not fit any recognized pattern of behavior; hence, you lack
reference to such a pattern as a way of understanding yourself and
explaining yourself to others.
We define ourselves in large part by the social roles we play, roles
provided by the society-or perhaps better, the societies-in which
we live. Those roles define the possibilities open to us. You cannot,
for example, be a lawyer except in a society governed by law; practice
medicine unless the society you are in recognizes the practice; be a
professional race car driver except in a community that recognizes the
sport.36 The point extends even to being a parent, child, lover, or
spouse. Being a parent is a relationship that takes on different mean-
ings and definitions depending on the society in which the relationship
is realized. Our conception of these roles is formed in part by ideals,
values, and expectations shared by those in the society in which we
were raised, educated, and in which we live.
C. Social Roles and Privacy
Privacy is essential if a self, defined by multiple roles, is to fulfill all
those roles successfully. The reason lies in the fact that social roles
not only provide a framework for understanding and explanation, but
also for evaluation. Social roles typically incorporate evaluative stan-
dards. Standards of professional conduct for lawyers are one such ex-
35. The example is adapted from id. at 310.
36. Id.
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ample; standards for teachers are another. 37 We also-and this is the
crucial point for privacy-evaluate the ways in which we combine
roles in a single self. In our society, for example, bird-watching is re-
garded as an avocation. If one was a monomaniacal bird watcher de-
voting virtually every waking hour to bird-watching to the exclusion of
other pursuits, one would provoke questions. We would want to know
why that person would build a whole life around watching birds. It
would be eccentric at best; at worst, an unhealthy obsession that
wastes one's life.
Most would likely concur with this assessment. Other examples,
however, are much more controversial. Some think that it is wrong to
combine being gay or lesbian with being a parent; others sharply disa-
gree. Exploring sexuality in sex clubs is, in the eyes of many, unac-
ceptable in a candidate for political office.38 Many parents would
have qualms about an exemplary elementary school teacher who at
night drinks himself or herself into oblivion, or indulges a passion for
pornography. An associate in a traditional, conservative law firm
might face strong disapproval and even termination of employment if
the senior partners discovered the associate's anonymous calls for rad-
ical reform of the legal profession. A thirty-five-year-old man who
has lived a law-abiding and exemplary life as a pediatrician, husband,
and parent may face family turmoil and employment problems when
the hospital in which he works and his family learn of his arrest for
possessing an ounce of marijuana at nineteen and his violation of sod-
omy laws in his one homosexual relationship at twenty-two. In gen-
eral, the expectations we create in others when we are in one role may
be deeply disappointed when they find us in what they regard as an
incompatible role. The consequences can range from disapproval and
dislike to loss of employment and ostracization. Indeed, it is possible
that
our society will see a growing number of individuals who are disen-
franchised for life. Large numbers will not be able to find employ-
ment because of negative information . . .- whether true or not-
from years gone by. Or they will be relegated to lower-paying jobs
in the service industries, unable to bring their true abilities into the
employment marketplace. We [www.privacyrights.org] have been
contacted by many such individuals in our ten-year history. I be-
lieve, sadly, we will be contacted by many more.
39
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Sarah Hall, Jeri Ryan Sex-Club Scandal (June 22, 2004), available at http://movies.
eonline.comNews/Items/0,1,14 3 6 6 ,00.htm.
39. Givens, supra note 15.
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We cannot rely on tolerance and reasoned discussion to protect us.
Our disagreements are too sharp and fundamental and too resistant to
rational resolution. As John Rawls notes,
[L]ong historical experience suggests, and many plausible reflec-
tions confirm, that ... reasoned and uncoerced agreement are not
to be expected .... Our individual and associative points of view,
intellectual affinities and affective attachments, are too diverse, es-
pecially in a free democratic society, to allow of lasting and rea-
soned agreement. Many conceptions of the world can plausibly be
constructed from different standpoints. Diversity naturally arises
from our limited powers and distinct perspectives; it is unrealistic to
suppose that all our differences are rooted solely in ignorance and
perversity, or else in the rivalries that result from scarcity. [The ap-
propriate view of social organization] takes deep and unresolvable
differences on matters of fundamental significance as a permanent
condition of human life.4 0
Privacy-in the sense of the ability to control what others do and do
not know about us-serves as an essential sanctuary. It allows the
exemplary elementary school teacher to combine that activity with
whatever private passions the teacher wishes to indulge. When sod-
omy laws were still enforced, privacy allowed gay men to conduct
their sexual lives as they wished.
D. The Technology Threat
Technology threatens to destroy the ability of privacy to play its
sanctuary-providing role. A comparison with the past reveals the pre-
sent danger. Fifty years ago it was much easier for privacy to play its
sanctuary-providing role. The reason was that we could, through our
own efforts, ensure that the zone of privacy we thought we ought to
have, more or less coincided with the zone of privacy we in fact had.41
Suppose, for example, that you and I wished to communicate without
others eavesdropping. We could do so by finding a place to converse
out of earshot of others. Even if we suspected sophisticated surveil-
lance, we could defeat such attempts much more easily a half a cen-
tury ago than we can now. In short, we could-much more so than
today-ensure that what we thought ought to be private would in fact
be private. This is what technology has changed. It has greatly cur-
tailed our ability to ensure that what we think ought to be private
really is concealed from unwanted eyes.
40. John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 542 (1980).
41. The security expert Bruce Schneier emphasizes this point. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS
AND LIES 30 (2000).
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E. Irony and Regulation
There is an irony here worth noting. Consider that the technologi-
cal threats to privacy and the self are a product of developments in
democratic nation-states and their market economies. 42 Technological
innovation has flourished in this environment, producing, among
other things, the surveillance technologies that now threaten privacy.
The irony is that we owe the freedom to construct a multifaceted self
in large part to the same sources that have produced the threat-dem-
ocratic institutions and the market economy. As analysts as diverse as
the nineteenth century sociologist Georg Simmel and the twentieth
century economist Fredrick Hayek have emphasized, by replacing feu-
dal forms of organization and production and by promoting mobility
and communication,
the development of capitalism creates more complex forms of indi-
viduality, since individuals can pursue a wider range of unconnected
interests and belong to multiple associations without being defined
(or swallowed up) by anyone. Those associations create linkages
across borders, which means, for example, that two chamber music
enthusiasts, one in Peoria, the other in Pretoria, may have more in
common with one another than each has with his more immediate
neighbors. Under such circumstances individual identity arises from
the set of one's interests and associations, a set different, in theory
at least, for each individual and valued precisely because it is volun-
tarily chosen.43
If we are to retain our freedom, we need to regain the control that
technology has taken from us. To preserve the efficient functioning of
the market-the very market that has played a central role in giving
us our freedom-we should use top-down regulation sparingly in our
efforts to regain control over our personal information. We should
opt for bottom-up regulation whenever doing so is consistent with the
value we place on privacy.
IV. THE "CONSENT REQUIREMENT"
An attractive, bottom-up way to regulate privacy is to impose a
"consent requirement." That is, we pass a statute that requires busi-
nesses to obtain our consent before they collect certain types of infor-
mation about us. The more types of information businesses cannot
42. Market economies and democratic institutions foster technological innovation by provid-
ing the freedom to experiment and rewarding successful entrepreneurs. See generally JERRY Z.
MULLER, THE MIND AND THE MARKET: CAPITALISM IN WESTERN THouoHT 400 (2002).
43. For a discussion of the theories of the scholars Simmel and Hayek, see id. at 242-52,
347-87.
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collect without consent, the greater privacy protection the statute
provides.44
The consent requirement is a "bottom-up" approach because it
leaves the decision about when to disclose information in the hands of
individual consumers. If businesses desire information consumers
loathe to disclose, businesses can encourage disclosure by offering dis-
counts on purchases or other forms of compensation. The resulting
pattern of interactions among consumers and businesses determines
the tradeoff between privacy and efficiency. The absence of inflexible,
top-down planning allows innovation and experimentation, and his-
tory shows that, in times of technological change, economies flourish
best when regulation does not stifle inventiveness.45
The consent requirement appears to solve with one stroke the pri-
vacy problem technology creates. The problem is that technology
greatly reduces our ability to control what others know about us. 46
The consent requirement appears to return, by law, the control that
technology has stolen. The requirement ensures a zone of privacy,
which others may not-other things being equal-invade without our
explicit, prior consent. In effect, this is to treat privacy like property.
The consent requirement gives us a right to exclude others from per-
sonal information, but the right is not inalienable. We can, if we so
wish, grant third parties a license to use our personal information.
There are two types of objections to the consent requirement.
Some object because it treats privacy like property; others object that
the requirement fails to adequately protect privacy. This section con-
siders the first objection. The next two sections discuss the second
objection.
A. The Inalienability Objection
Some contend that privacy-or, at least certain aspects of it-
should be inalienable. They see treating privacy as alienable as incon-
sistent with the role privacy plays in protecting our freedom to de-
velop our identities. 47
One difficulty is to identify the relevant aspects and explain why we
should not have the right to disclose them. Imagine I write an autobi-
44. I will bypass the question of what types of information should be included; my focus is on
the requirement of consent itself, not on the types of information involved.
45. See generally Benn Steil et al., Introduction and Overview, in TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVA-
TION & ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (Benn Steil et al. eds., 2002).
46. See supra Part II.A.
47. See generally ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCI-
ETY 136 (1988).
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ography that reveals the most intimate aspects of my marriage in great
detail. Why should I not have the right to sell it to a publisher? If the
answer is that the intimate details of my marriage do not qualify as an
inalienable aspect of privacy, then what does? A second difficulty is
that we should be quite uncomfortable with the idea that the state
should define what we can and cannot disclose about ourselves. To do
so is, in part, to define the sort of relations we are allowed to have
with others, and constraining those relations is a substantial interfer-
ence with our freedom of association. The better course is to leave
decisions about what to disclose up to individuals.
B. The Commodification Objection
Some object that treating privacy like property "commodifies" pri-
vacy. An item is commodified to the extent that we are willing to
exchange it for a price in the market.48 Commodification is objection-
able when it leads us to value improperly the items we exchange. Im-
agine that both the Mona Lisa and chewing gum discarded by Britney
Spears are for sale on eBay; suppose the chewing gum sells for a
higher price. If we conclude that the Mona Lisa has less value-not
market value, but cultural and aesthetic value-than Britney's gum,
we improperly value the items in question. Critics of the market-
including Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes-have complained
that commodification does indeed lead us to value items improperly. 49
Keynes hoped that increasing affluence would cure the ills he saw in a
market economy:
When the accumulation of wealth is no longer of high social impor-
tance, there will be great changes in the code of morals. We shall be
able to rid ourselves of many pseudo-moral principles which have
hag-ridden us for two hundred years, by which we have exalted
some of the most distasteful of human qualities into the position of
the highest virtues. We shall be able to afford to dare to assess the
money motive at its true value. The love of money as a posses-
sion-as distinguished from the love of money as a means to the
enjoyments and realities of life-will be recognised for what it is, a
somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those semicriminal, semi-
pathological propensities which one hands over with a shudder to
the specialists in mental disease.50
48. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 57
(1993); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1855 (1987).
49. See MULLER, supra note 42, at 317-22 (offering an illuminating historical discussion of this
theme, including commentaries on Smith and Keynes).
50. Id. at 319.
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The "love of money as a possession" 51 leads many people to assess the
true value of an item in light of its exchange value in the market, and
it would be foolish to ignore this fact, which critics have warned of
since the rise of capitalism. 52
There are, however, two reasons not to be particularly concerned
about improperly valuing privacy as a result of commodification.
First, we routinely exchange highly personal aspects of ourselves for
money without ceasing to value them properly. Like every other em-
ployed educator, I exchange my intellectual abilities for money, yet-
and I doubt I am atypical-I still see significant non-market value in
intellectual activity. Indeed, I pursue intellectual projects primarily
because of their non-market rewards. It is an unavoidable aspect of a
market economy that we all have to strike some balance between the
freedom to pursue whatever ends we regard as worthwhile and the
need to make money. Merely "to survive in market one must make a
particular kind of contribution-a marketable one. No other alterna-
tive is open; no choice. Most adults, then, in a market system work or
perish. '53 Each of us decides how we want to use our freedom: more
work, more money, less leisure; or, less work, less money, more lei-
sure. The consent requirement provides a similar choice in the case of
privacy.
Second, treating privacy as property can promote valuing privacy
properly. Indeed, the point of treating privacy as property is not so
much to make it exchangeable as to allow us to protect it, to define a
zone of privacy that businesses cannot invade without consent. Treat-
ing privacy as property highlights its proper value.
None of this is intended to deny that commodification is worrisome.
My contention is that, in the case of the consent requirement, it is not
a sufficiently pressing worry to deter us from imposing that require-
ment. The critical question about the consent requirement is, instead,
whether it can actually succeed in adequately protecting privacy? To
answer, we need to identify the threats that reduce our ability to con-
trol what others know about us.
51. Id.; see also JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and
Money, in THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 376 (Donald Moggridge ed.,
1973).
52. See MULLER, supra note 42, at 319.
53. LINDBLOM, supra note 7, at 187 (noting that "[tihe classical economists applauded the
market system because it coerced the masses to work, doing so by the 'silent, unremitted pres-
sure' of hunger, as one of them, William Townsend, put it").
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V. THE THREATS
The threats divide into two categories: Lack of consent and techno-
logical inadequacies.
A. Lack of Consent
Businesses deny us control over what others know about us when
they collect information about us without our consent. Lack of con-
sent is common on the Internet. When one visits a website, the visit
typically triggers the deposit on a computer hard drive of programs,
called "cookies," that garner information and return it to advertis-
ers.54 It is arguable that one gives implied consent to the use of cook-
ies since it is possible to change a computer's Internet browser settings
to prevent their use. However, many sites will refuse access to In-
ternet users who block cookies, so the implied consent you give by not
blocking cookies does not necessarily represent a truly meaningful
choice among viable options. In addition, consent to cookies is often
less than fully informed; many are unaware of just how much informa-
tion the cookies collect and who receives that information.55
Even when websites do attempt to obtain consent to collect and use
information, the "consent" they obtain is often defective. Many web-
sites offer a privacy policy that informs users about what information
the business collects and what it does with that information. 56 Unfor-
tunately, policies are often written in a confusing and deceptive fash-
ion to suggest that the business offers more privacy protection than it
really does. 57 Moreover, the mechanisms by which consumers indi-
cate consent often defeat, rather than promote, the attempt to give
free and informed consent. Consent is often solicited through the re-
quest to check a box if one agrees to let the business collect informa-
tion and use it in certain ways. The box is often checked by default;
this means one must notice the box and uncheck it to avoid giving
"consent." In many cases, if one returns to the page to correct errone-
ously entered information or for some other reason, the box is again
checked by default, one must notice that and uncheck it again.
54. See Definitions of Cookie on the Web, at http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=define
%3A+cookie (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
55. See Wayne Porter, Internet Cookies-Spyware or Neutral Technology, available at http://
www.spywareguide.com/articles/internetcookies-spyware orne_57.html (last visited Mar. 28,
2005).
56. See Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of
Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1099 (1999).
57. Id.
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Even when a consumer has given free and informed consent to the
disclosure of information, data aggregation may extend the effects of
that disclosure in ways the consumer did not contemplate and to
which he or she would not have given consent. As Professor Daniel
Solove explains,
[ain individual may give out bits of information in different con-
texts, each transfer appearing innocuous. However, the information
can be aggregated and could prove to be invasive of the private life
when combined with other information. It is the totality of informa-
tion about a person and how it is used that poses the greatest threat
to privacy .... From the standpoint of each particular information
transaction, individuals will not have enough facts to make a truly
informed decision. The potential future uses of that information are
too vast and unknown to enable individuals to make the appropri-
ate valuation. 58
Suppose, for example, that Jones, whose best friend is struggling with
depression, has spent considerable time on websites and in Internet
discussion groups devoted to clinical depression. The sites and discus-
sion groups keep a record of these activities. Jones is aware of the
data collection activities and, by his use of the sites and groups, gives
implied consent to the data collection. Unfortunately, a summary of
the recorded information appears in a background check, run by a
potential employer, who denies Jones a job on this basis. Jones would
never have consented to the potential employer's possession and use
of the information. The Jones example is an instance of private data
collection. In the case of public records, we generally do not even
have the option of withholding consent to the initial disclosure of in-
formation. Indeed, "in the majority of situations, providing personal
information to government agencies and courts is mandatory. Individ-
uals have no choice in the matter. '59
B. Inadequate Technology
Inadequate technology threatens privacy in three ways. The first
way in which inadequate technology threatens privacy is improper
"anonymization." Information is anonymized when all references
have been removed that would allow one to identify the individual the
information describes. Anonymization provides an important degree
of control over what others know about us; a guarantee of anonymiza-
tion allows you to be sure that the information you release will not be
used to construct a picture of you. The protection anonymization pro-
58. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1452 (2001).
59. Givens, supra note 15.
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vides can be illusory, however. Anonymization, if not properly per-
formed, leaves a trail that can be traced back to personally identifying
information. 60 Further, even properly anonymized data may be used
to identify individuals. I am, for example, the only person in the cate-
gory defined by the following two factors: (1) Has a Ph.D. in philoso-
phy and (2) currently teaches at Chicago-Kent College of Law. Any
information pertaining to the people in this category can only be
about me. This problem arises in anonymizing health care data.
There may, for example, be only one person treated in way X for dis-
ease Y in hospital Z in a given time period.
61
The second way in which technology threatens privacy is inadequate
error prevention. Errors in non-anonymized, personally identifying
information decrease our control over what others know-or, bet-
ter-think they know about us. Errors transform information we con-
sented to disclose into a false and misleading picture, which we have
not consented to make public.62 The more inadequate error preven-
tion and detection, the more control we lose.
Finally, "[s]ecurity and privacy are inextricably linked. The protec-
tion of information depends in large part on the existence of security
measures to protect that information. ' 63 Unfortunately, security on
many networks is quite poor. 64 The weaker security, the more unau-
thorized access to information; the more unwanted eyes obtain unau-
thorized access, the more information is distributed beyond the
bounds of our consent and expectations.
VI. LIMITS OF THE CONSENT REQUIREMENT
To what extent does the consent requirement adequately meet the
threats identified in the previous part? It fails to adequately address
the threats posed by inadequate technology and by aggregation. It
does adequately meet the problems posed by lack of consent in non-
aggregation cases. The latter point is important because it shows that
60. See, e.g., Richard Clayton et al., Real World Patterns of Failure in Anonymity Systems
(2001), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/-rncl/Patterns ofFailure.pdf.
61. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private
Sector, 80 IowA L. REV. 497, 509 (1995) (noting the ease with which one can link information to
specific individuals).
62. See SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21st CEN-
TURY 25-31 (2001).
63. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 162, 164 (2003).
64. As security expert Bruce Schneier notes, "[t]oday there are no real consequences for hav-
ing bad security. In fact, the market place rewards bad security." Bruce Schneier, Remarks at
University of California, Berkeley Workshop on Economics and Information Security (May
16-17, 2002).
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we only need top-down regulation to respond to the technology and
aggregation threats.
A. Lack of Consent in Non-Aggregation Cases
The consent requirement can require that websites contain easily
understandable, unambiguous privacy policies and can prohibit such
practices as having check-boxes indicating consent obtained by de-
fault. The worry is whether privacy policies really produce adequately
informed consent. Professor Solove raises this objection forcefully.
He contends that a consumer "has difficulty assigning the proper
value to personal information. It is difficult for the individual to ade-
quately value specific pieces of information .... Because this value is
linked to uncertain future uses, it is difficult, if not impossible, for an
individual to adequately value her information. ' ' 65 Improper valua-
tion means that consumers will sometimes make decisions about dis-
closing information that are the opposite of those that they would
make if they were better informed. To the extent that consumers mis-
takenly impart information that they would withhold were they better
informed, they impair their privacy. To the extent that they mistak-
enly withhold information that they would impart were they better
informed, they impair market efficiency without any offsetting privacy
gain. Is Solove correct? Is it difficult for consumers to value informa-
tion because "this value is linked to uncertain future uses? '66 The
effects of data aggregation are a large part of Solove's basis for this
claim, but we are considering aggregation separately. Let us ask
whether, apart from aggregation, consumers have sufficient knowl-
edge to determine whether to disclose information.
To take myself as an example, there are two instances in which I
know enough to determine whether to disclose information even if I
am uncertain about its potential uses. First, there is information so
extremely personal that I will keep it absolutely private. I do not need
to know proposed uses of this information to decide not to disclose it.
Second, at the other extreme, there is information I will readily dis-
close no matter what use may be made of it (within broad limits; I will
return to this qualification). Suppose, for example, I purchase toilet
paper and a bottle of red wine at a grocery store, which retains a re-
cord that I purchased those items at a particular price on a particular
day. I have no objection to the grocery store having that information.
Indeed, I want the store to have it because it can use it to provide me
65. Solove, supra note 58, at 1452.
66. Id.
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with products I want, run a more efficient store, and pass the effi-
ciency savings on to me in the form of lower costs. I do not care what
else they do with the information. As far as I am concerned, they can
publish it on a billboard at the exit of the Lincoln Tunnel into New
York City. There are limitations, of course. I would not want some-
one to compile a history of all of my purchases of wine during my
lifetime and publish the information on a website asserting that my
wine consumption was excessive.
I disclose information to the store against a background assumption
that the uses that will be made of the information will stay within cer-
tain broad limits; however, I can be confident that the assumption is
true. I am simply not important enough for anyone to go to the
trouble of, for example, compiling a detailed picture of my purchases
of wine. Of course, this could change. For example, insurance compa-
nies might become interested in patterns of alcohol consumption. In
this regard, the invasion of my privacy arises from data aggregation.
Adequately controlling data aggregation requires top-down regulation
that restricts aggregation and the use of aggregated information; such
regulation can prevent the invasions of privacy resulting from the ag-
gregation of information that, bit by individual bit, poses no privacy
threat.
In the intermediate cases between the two extremes, uncertainty
about the use of information can be more of a concern. I may, for
example, be reluctant to disclose my opinions and political allegiances
to my local congressperson's re-election campaign unless I am assured
that the information will not be passed on to the party's national com-
mittee.67 However, uncertainty about this potential use does not
mean I cannot make a rational decision about whether to disclose in-
formation. It just means I face a decision under uncertainty. If I do
not want to run the risk of the unwanted use of my information, I
simply do not disclose it. If businesses want me to disclose informa-
tion that uncertainty makes me withhold, they simply have to elimi-
nate the uncertainty by agreeing to limit their uses to those acceptable
to me. They can do this, for example, through privacy policies.
Some will object that consumers do not take the time and trouble to
read privacy policies, 68 and hence that it is simply naive to think that
67. The consent requirement is consistent with granting a limited license. Professor Solove,
however, assumes the opposite when he argues that "[slince the ownership model involves indi-
viduals relinquishing full title to the information, they have little idea how such information will
be used when in the hands of others." Id.
68. See Kang, supra note 3, at 1248 (stating that "[f]or numerous reasons, such as transaction
costs, individuals and information collectors do not generally negotiate and conclude express
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detailed privacy policies are an effective method of communication.
In response, we should distinguish between two cases. In the first,
consumers do not read the privacy policy because they do not care
sufficiently about what the business will do with the information they
disclose-my lack of concern about my toilet paper and wine
purchases illustrates the point. Here, the failure to read the privacy
policy does not show that the consent requirement fails to protect pri-
vacy; it just shows that consumers do not pointlessly waste their time
and effort.69 In the second case, consumers who do not read the pol-
icy withhold information they would disclose if they read it and were
reassured by the privacy protections offered. If businesses want the
information consumers are not disclosing, they can find a way to pre-
sent the relevant aspects of the privacy practices in a way that makes it
more likely that consumers will become aware of them. If businesses
fail to do so, then the cost of acquiring the information is not worth
the cost of reaching out to the consumers. As a result, information
remains private unless businesses find it sufficiently important to them
to invest in encouraging its disclosure. Here the consent requirement
works precisely as intended. The point is to allow consumers and
businesses to strike a balance between privacy and efficiency.
To summarize, the consent requirement does appear to do just what
we want: To strike an appropriate balance between privacy and effi-
ciency. Two objections remain to this claim. First, the consent re-
quirement cannot adequately address the technological threats to
privacy. Second, it cannot adequately address the problems posed by
aggregation.
B. Technical Requirements
It may appear that the consent requirement can adequately address
the technological threats. Why not simply require that privacy policies
include information about the adequacy of their anonymization, error
prevention, and security provisions? The problem is that consumers
could not properly evaluate this information. Anonymization, error
privacy contracts before engaging in each and every cyberspace transaction"). See also GARFIN-
KEL, supra note 62; Sovern. supra note 56, at 1033.
69. Some may think that this attributes much too much rationality to consumers. The ques-
tion of the degree of consumer rationality is an empirical one, of course. Methodologically,
however, we are justified in assuming a fair degree of rationality. Democratic forms of political
organization function properly only when citizens are sufficiently informed and sufficiently ra-
tional. The text pursues the question of how to legislate privacy protections in a properly func-
tioning democracy. If the rationality of citizens as a whole falls below what a properly
functioning democracy requires, then we have more serious problems than simply protecting
privacy.
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prevention, and security are technical and controversial topics; con-
sumers generally lack the knowledge necessary to assess the adequacy
of these procedures.
Protection here must come from market or legal incentives to adopt
adequate measures. The current consensus is that market incentives
fail to lead websites to adopt adequate measures.70 Consequently, it
appears that legal regulation is required. The Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act (HIPAA) illustrates a detailed legisla-
tive approach to specifying technological requirements for protecting
online medical information.71 It is, however, far from clear that
HIPAA's extensive requirements are appropriate in all cases of online
data storage. The issue of appropriate technological requirements is a
critical one that calls for detailed treatment.
72
C. Aggregation
In the case of aggregation, the consent requirement fails to strike an
adequate balance between privacy and efficiency. The essential diffi-
culty is that data may be aggregated by a variety of third parties for a
wide range of purposes over a number of years. Thus, when consum-
ers divulge individual bits of information, it is virtually impossible for
them to predict the ways in which that information will be aggregated
and the uses to which the aggregated information will be put. Two
results follow. First, concern for the unpredictable aggregation conse-
quences will lead some consumers to withhold information that they
would willingly disclose if they could predict its uses in future data
aggregation. The result is that we forego the efficiency gain we would
reap from disclosure without any offsetting privacy protection. Put-
ting information about aggregation in privacy policies is not the solu-
tion. How is a business to cost-effectively obtain information about
what any number of third-party aggregators are likely to do with in-
formation over a period of several years? Second, some consumers
will fail to realize or misjudge the aggregation risk and disclose infor-
mation they would withhold were they better informed. Here the effi-
ciency gain from disclosure results from a failure properly to protect
privacy. We see an extreme case of this failure in the case of public
70. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
71. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 45 C.F.R. pts. 160. 162, 164
(2003).
72. See TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND COMMON CRITERIA TASK FORCE, NAT'L CYBER SECUR-
ITY P'SHIP, RECOMMENDATIONS REPORT app. D (Apr. 2004), available at http://www.cyberpart
nership.org/TF4TechReport.pdf (rejecting a "one size fits all" approach to data protection and
arguing that different standards are appropriate for different types of systems).
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records when it is mandatory to divulge information to governmental
agencies. The use of the information by private parties is completely
unconstrained by any consent requirement.
Excessive disclosure causes two types of harm-one private, one
public. The private harm is a reduction in the freedom of specific indi-
viduals. Jones is denied employment as a result of depression-related
Internet activities. Previous examples illustrate the point.73 The
thirty-five-year-old law-abiding, irreproachable pediatrician, husband,
and parent faces family turmoil and employment problems when the
hospital in which he works and his family learn of his arrest for mari-juana at nineteen and his violation of sodomy laws at twenty-two. The
exemplary elementary school teacher is exposed to public censure for
indulging in his or her passion for alcohol or pornography. Fear of
such exposure deters others from exploring roles that they would oth-
erwise adopt.
The public harm is a harm to the social roles themselves. Aggrega-
tion can undermine the social roles that form frameworks in which we
understand ourselves and through which we are understood by others.
Businesses can use customer data in ways that alter this framework in
objectionable ways. Ann Bartow argues that this is happening on the
Internet with the "female" role.74 She argues that businesses on the
web are aggregating data to construct a profile of the typical female
consumer, and she contends that "[d]atum by datum, woman by
woman, the cyber-definition of 'female' is being constructed.... De-
rivative e-stereotypes, braced by a plenitude of personal information,
will appear scientific and incontrovertible."75 Bartow worries that
both men and women will understand women through a business-con-
structed stereotype that distorts perceptions of women and limits their
possibilities. 76 Whether or not Bartow is correct about this particular
claim, it is certainly true that aggregation may create or reenforce per-
nicious stereotypes. Joel Reidenberg, for example, cites Acxiom, one
of the largest information-selling companies, as an example of the use
of data aggregation to engage in "invidious stereotyping." 77 He con-
tends that "[t]he company offered 'a comprehensive ethnicity coding
system' . . . [and] also proposed to clients coding that resembled Nazi
Germany's Nuremberg laws."'78 We should certainly be concerned
73. See supra Part III.C.
74. Bartow, supra note 6, at 653-54.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 655-58.
77. Reidenberg, supra note 5, at 883.
78. Id. (quoting AcxioM PRODUCr CATALOG 5 (1999)).
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here that business-constructed stereotypes will distort our percep-
tions, create new prejudices, and feed existing ones.
Top-down regulation that restricts the use of aggregated informa-
tion is required to prevent both the private and public harms aggrega-
tion causes. But it will prove difficult to find an appropriate approach.
Aggregation plays an important role in improving economic efficiency
by improving the ability of advertisers to target their message.
79 To
protect privacy, we must sacrifice some efficiency, and the context in
which we must do so is still one in which we are seeing rapid techno-
logical and economic innovation. Moreover, governments as a rule
face considerable difficulty in centrally directing economies,
80 and, in
this case, the task is made all the more difficult by the fact that we do
not agree about the importance of various aspects of privacy.
8
' What
one person sees as an intolerable invasion, another finds entirely
acceptable.
VII. CONCLUSION
To ensure the privacy necessary for the free realization of our iden-
tities, we must regain, through legal regulation, the control over per-
sonal information that we have lost through technological innovation.
This requires a combination of bottom-up and top-down regulation.
Top-down regulation requires that we arrive at a public consensus
about the appropriate trade-off between efficiency and privacy. In a
society marked by fundamental disagreement on moral and political
matters, this will prove extraordinarily difficult. HIPAA's difficulties
provide a glimpse of the problems to come.82 Many complain that
HIPAA is excessively burdensome on those subject to its require-
ments and that its privacy protection requirements block many legiti-
mate and important uses of information.8 3 Top-down privacy
regulation presents a formidable challenge to democratic governments
in massive nation-states characterized by widespread disagreement on
fundamental moral and political matters. Meeting this challenge is a
critically important task that urgently requires attention.
79. See supra Part II.A.
80. Compare MULLER, supra note 42 (offering an illuminating historical discussion of this
fact), with LINDBLOM, supra note 7 (providing a non-historical defense).
81. See generally AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (1999) (discussing privacy contro-
versies in a variety of contexts).
82. See, e.g., Press Release, EurekAlert, Study: National Medical Privacy Law Makes Health
Research Harder, More Expensive (Mar. 11, 2004), http://www.eurekalert.org/pub-releases/
2004-03/uomh-snmO3llO4.php.
83. Id.
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